Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Response to Slote' and 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding'

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122 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 5. Opposites
Opposites are as unlike as possible [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Plato's 'Parmenides' is the greatest artistic achievement of the ancient dialectic [Hegel on Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
Plato found antinomies in ideas, Kant in space and time, and Bradley in relations [Plato, by Ryle]
Plato's 'Parmenides' is perhaps the best collection of antinomies ever made [Russell on Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]
You must always mean the same thing when you utter the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Greatness and smallness must exist, to be opposed to one another, and come into being in things [Plato]
If admirable things have Forms, maybe everything else does as well [Plato]
If absolute ideas existed in us, they would cease to be absolute [Plato]
Plato moves from Forms to a theory of genera and principles in his later work [Plato, by Frede,M]
It would be absurd to think there were abstract Forms for vile things like hair, mud and dirt [Plato]
The concept of a master includes the concept of a slave [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The whole idea of each Form must be found in each thing which participates in it [Plato]
If things are made alike by participating in something, that thing will be the absolute idea [Plato]
If things partake of ideas, this implies either that everything thinks, or that everything actually is thought [Plato]
Participation is not by means of similarity, so we are looking for some other method of participation [Plato]
Each idea is in all its participants at once, just as daytime is a unity but in many separate places at once [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If absolute greatness and great things are seen as the same, another thing appears which makes them seem great [Plato]
Nothing can be like an absolute idea, because a third idea intervenes to make them alike (leading to a regress) [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Parts must belong to a created thing with a distinct form [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Plato says only a one has parts, and a many does not [Plato, by Harte,V]
Anything which has parts must be one thing, and parts are of a one, not of a many [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
There is no such thing as chance [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume]
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume]
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume]
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume]
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume]
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume]
All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume]
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume]
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume]
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume]
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume]
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume]
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume]
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume]
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume]
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume]
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume]
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume]
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume]
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume]
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Only a great person can understand the essence of things, and an even greater person can teach it [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume]
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume]
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G]
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume]
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume]
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume]
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume]
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume]
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume]
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume]
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume]